The Translator. Volume 7, Number 2 (2001), 249-263 ISBN 1-900650-50-9

Interpreters-in-Aid at Disasters

Community interpreting in the Process of Disaster Management

ALEV BULIJT & TURGAY KURULTAY

Istanbul University, Turkey

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Abstract. *Voluntary interpreting services for foreign Search and Rescue teams at disaster sites remain one of the least instituti onalized forms of community interpreting. Yet training and careful planning are required in order to eliminate possible conflicts due to race, culture, religion, language, ethnicity and the like. The success of such interpreting depends on the careful handling of sensitive cross-cultural issues. The earthquakes that devastated part of Turkey in 1999 revealed the need to plan interpreting services within the overall process of disaster management. Here issues are raised concerning the international search and rescue operation guidelines and the code of conduct of the relief interpreters, especially as such questions affect an interpreter-in-Aid at Disasters (iAD) training project. The ethical framework of iAD, practised by qualfled independent voluntary interpreters in order to help save lives in disasters, is purely communicative and situation-oriented. The mutual benefit hypothesis thus works for the voluntary interpreter thanks to the satisfaction of being an indispensable intermediary, helping to rescue the largest number of lives possible via effective and efficient communication, and undertaking full responsibility for the initiatives required.*

On 17 August and 12 November 1999, two earthquakes struck the Marmara region of Turkey. The disasters brought us face to face with the need to improve the community interpreting done for foreign Search and Rescue (SR) teams. The urgent need for volunteers to interpret for SR teams forcefully revealed a lack of planning and organization. Following these two devastating earthquakes, academics working in the field of translation at Istanbul University, who practise translation and interpreting, started a pilot project

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on this newly emerging form of community interpreting. The changing status of interpreting of this kind requires awareness of a new practice in an ‘old’ field, the methodology and the research of which are far from being sufficiently developed.

1. The Interpreter-in-Aid at Disasters Project

The Interpreter-in-Aid at Disasters Project (LAD) – Afette Rehber çevirmen (ARc) in Turkish – was launched by the Department of Translation of the Faculty of Letters of Istanbul University in December 1999. It is currently in the process of being institutionalized, in the sense of being provided with a coherent institutional structure, with the support and the cooperation of various people and organizations. When we initially started discussing the requirements of the situation, we were able to agree on a number of general aims. These objectives helped us concentrate on what we could *actually* do rather than dream about doing more than we were able to do and thus end up wasting valuable time before another earthquake hit our country. The main aims of the LAD task force are thus as follows, taken from the agreement signed by the Turkish General Directorate of Civil Defence and the Turkish Translation

Association:

1. To provide volunteers (interpreters, translators and those competent in languages) with a special training programme that will enable them to act responsibly as part of a macro-plan of action at times of disaster;
2. To prepare qualified interpreters for an emergency situation with the help of the LAD task force, institutionally represented by the Turkish Translation Association.

An Interpreter-in-Md at Disasters (LAD) is ideally an individual who has training and experience in basic interpreting skills along with a background in technical terminology, rescue operations and the coordinating role of a coniimunity interpreter as an actively responsible intermediary in the process of disaster management (see the items of the LAD Code of Conduct in the appendix).

Living on the same globe, we naturally share the consequences of disasters and devastation. The problems following a disaster in a country or in a region can only be overcome with the assistance of other countries and regions. International coordination of assistance and response makes it possible to increase the number of fast and effective alternatives available. National and local preparations thus need to be supported by regional and international organizations. The INSARAG – International Search and Rescue Advisory Group – was therefore formed after the earthquake in Armenia in 1991, and international disaster-response cooperation has developed signifi

cantly in the 10 years that followed.

In a major earthquake situation, no matter how high the level of preparedness at the local and national levels, there is an increasing need for assistance from foreign SR teams. The guidance and the direction provided to those teams can directly affect the quality of their services. The host country must quickiy transport the teams to their sites of assignment, establish initial contact and coordination with the national and international organizations, and provide the teams with the information and feedback they require. All of this should clearly be part of disaster response. The interpreters who work as members of the SR teams (or of other teams) can be valuable assistants in this respect, guiding and helping to coordinate the foreign SR teams. Such assistance is part of the task description of the TAD, a role in keeping with INSARAG's view that "inter-team coordination can help maximize the use of available resources by matching team capabilities, thereby avoiding duplication of efforts" (INSARAG 2000).

The LAD project focuses equally on community interpreting and disaster planning, giving both a more professional outlook by integrating interpreting into the disaster management process. What is new in this project is not providing community interpreting at disasters but transforming an existing form of community interpreting into a professionalized field of translation. The standardization and relative professionalism to be achieved through the LAD project should help in the initial phases of disaster management.

This kind of interpreting has features that are typical of community interpreting in many respects. Yet there are other features that may be attributed to the specific nature of disasters, and which have particular implications for the ethics involved:

- Disasters are emergency situations where there is a need to make do with the resources available at hand.
- The spirit of cooperation has absolute priority; the goodwill and efforts of those who are ready to lend a hand are received with thanks (thus it may be unacceptable to refuse volunteer interpreters because they are not qualified or are inefficient).
- There is mutual tolerance; even faulty practices could be tolerated easily.
- It is quite difficult to assess beforehand what will be needed where; the best solutions are above all quick solutions to immediate and spontaneous needs.
- The members of Search and Rescue teams who know foreign languages are the most valuable interpreters, since they transfer messages that fall totally within their field of practice and expertise.
- Financial resources are limited; there is no question of paying high fees for interpreting services.
- The translational performance of the voluntary interpreters will vary greatly depending on their background.

In view of the above, LAD may be considered a sub-field of community interpreting, a public service that needs to be managed by a society's own resources. Many sub-fields of community interpreting, however, confront the interpreter with very difficult problems that go far beyond the question of linguistic competence. As Pollabauer (2000:187) notes, the interpreter not only transfers messages but also becomes one of the key actors in the process by introducing, avoiding and resolving conflicts of all sorts. And yet, since LAD is a sub-field of community interpreting where professionalism is not likely to be high and the relations between the parties remain obscure and unidentified (for the reasons given above), its conditions might be expected to change significantly with the initiatives taken by the individual interpreter.

The ethical guidelines that might be used for translating or interpreting in general – such as the ethics of working for a client to produce a specifically defined product, or guidelines emphasizing either the source or target norms
– might not work in relief interpreting. The voluntary interpreter with a foreign SR team is a self-employed, non-profit agent responsible for transferring information in a way appropriate to the situation. Their aim is to perform as well as possible, serving the ethical objective of helping to save the largest number of lives possible.

Disaster interpreting is at the same time a field highly suited to voluntary work by professional interpreters and translators. If this opportunity is made use ot many advantages should follow. Of course, community interpreting contexts are frequently initiated by non-governmental organizations, which mostly lack the financial means to hire professional interpreters. And yet professionals are generally well disposed to work for free in such contexts, especially alongside the SR teams, which become centres of attraction simply because they provide the most immediate and effective response. We thus included professional interpreters in the target group for our project, thinking that there might be many professional groups who would want to join such a work force without expecting anything in return. As it turned out, the Turkish Translation Association was actually keen to take over the organizing role, which was a significant contribution to the project.

2. The 1999 earthquakes in Turkey and an evaluation based on LAD services

The earthquake of 17 of August 1999 gave us an opportunity to observe the interpreting contexts and describe the situation of public service interpreters. Our research, which is still in progress, started with a detailed questionnaire distributed to the offices of the foreign SR teams that worked in Turkey in August and November 1999. We believe that the points made by a Swiss team working in Turkey during the earthquakes (SKIT, Iiumanitäre Flilfe und Schweizerisches Katastrophenhilfekorps) in response to this questionnaire can be generalized to a great extent:

1. The SR teams had no difficulty finding interpreters.
2. The interpreters did not have to undertake any tasks other than linguistic transfer.
3. The skills of the interpreters served well enough to establish communication (there were no problems due to their language competence, and they were not expected to know the technical terms).

The only prerequisite the SR team seemed to have for taking on interpreters was that they were over the age of *25*. This has to do with psychological considerations, not with translation skills. They did not note any insufficiency or need for improvement in the interpreting services obtained through personal contacts.

On the other hand, those who served as interpreters commented on their own shortcomings. They seemed most worried about their lack of terminology:
"I found at that moment that I did not know how to say 'hilti" or 'sledgehammer' in language X"; "I felt so insufficient, I need some SR training".

One important reason for the above positive comments was that SKIT (like other foreign SR teams in Turkey at the time) felt well understood by the Turkish government and people, and was thus able to work under suitable conditions. The relative chaos of the disaster context did not hinder the SR operations. Indeed, due to the significant shortcomings and lack of preparation on the Turkish side, the doors remained wide open to those with the means to respond to the disaster. This meant a huge spontaneous 'social movement'. The municipalities did not, or could not, have contempt for the foreign SR teams, which were welcomed with an openness beyond their expectations. The opposite of this situation, interestingly, occurred in the Kobe earthquake in Japan, in a country whose disaster preparedness is probably second to none. Japan's management and planning system collapsed at the Kobe earthquake; the country could not respond to the disaster properly, and yet it did not allow

foreign rescue teams to do so. National pride thus delayed the response. The Japanese apparently even imposed quarantine for the rescue dogs (Oakes *1998:30-35).* Similar points were made by the Turkish and German SR Teams who served during the major earthquake disaster in India. These teams noted that they could not work to their full capacity due to misleading information and negligence.

The picture in Turkey on 17 August with respect to cooperation was clearly very different. No one was adequately prepared for the disaster; the institutional frameworks established for this purpose fell unfortunately short of dealing with the situation; the legal regulations and procedures were a long way from being implemented. At a point when no one was ready for the disaster situation, even in the psychological sense of the word, came the earthquake, a disaster whose magnitude would have created serious problems even for a very well prepared society. Because of the shock response and the

pressure of public opinion, the government was very open to foreign and nnw-officiai inixThtives~, *fn* t½. aJstt that tI't'j &te,x hy-'y~ss& **hjy~~j~Jjp** regulations in order to speed up the response. On the other hand, government offices did declare their discontent with the number of civilian initiatives from time to time, claiming that excessive spontaneity created an atmosphere of over-flexibility and gave those who wanted to exploit the situation a tremendous opportunity to do so. The natural outcome of these discussions was that there was felt to be a need to plan for future disaster management. Yet people who reminded the authorities and the public of the regulations, or who responded to the offers of help negatively, had to confront harsh reactions from the public. Foreign SR teams, NGOs, volunteers and the public responded with a spirit of cooperation that was a kind of unprecedented 'social revolution'. The agonies and the shocks of the earthquake became inter- 7 mingled with the ecstasy of successful initiatives. The masses found themselves capable of an extraordinary degree of self-management, especially in the first weeks following the disaster. A Bakhtinian might have found an almost 'carnivalesque' atmosphere pervading the entire country.

This unpreparedness is not typical of modern societies, and much has changed in Turkey since 17 August 1999. The public institutions are now likely to play a more central role in a disaster situation. The INSARAG principles seem to have helped the Local Emergency Management Authority to function properly. Of course, traditional government structures and rigid bureaucratic attitudes might still be seen as negative aspects. Yet we are witnessing a happy and promising change in Turkey in terms of attitudes to planning, response and cooperation in general. Turkey is participating in international projects that are based on information exchange; it is now considering disaster response as part of international cooperation. This attitude, of course, has encouraged the authorities to approach the LAD project with considerable attention and support.

3. Problems and responsibilities awaiting interpreters in a disaster context

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The events of 17 August showed that in a disaster-response situation interpreters for foreign SR teams can be found spontaneously. The difficulties experienced, or thought to have been experienced, by the interpreters did not seem to impede the operations of the SR teams. True, the number of civilians rescued from the rubble might not have been influenced at all by the interpreters. Yet in various cases success in mobilizing the SR team quickly and at the sites most needed might depend on the interpreters, on their presence and efficiency. The role of the interpreter in such cases is a matter of life and death. In situations of turmoil an interpreter may have to deal with problems of establishing coordination and communication. Or they may have to refer

to their own background knowledge of regulations and procedures, or their personal relations, in order to overcome bureaucratic bafflers.

In view of such functions, the practice of interpreting consists of rather more than the transfer of messages verbalized in one language to be understood in the other. Interpreters are required to expand their duties to include communication coordination; they are naturally supposed to interpret the expectations of the relevant parties in light of the purpose of the action to be accomplished and thus establish the necessary contact between the parties. The transfer of verbal messages takes place within this framework. The key aspect of the process is not complete transfer but transfer carried out with regard to the purpose of the action.

Perhaps the most important prerequisite here is the interpreters' background knowledge of the subject. They need to acquire such knowledge through training (or by other means) and to reinforce it with experience. The training module discussed below thus includes reference to the pertinent regulations, simply because interpreters are supposed to coordinate not through their individual attitudes but through the institutional frameworks that constrain their work. More explicitly, the interpreter has to consider the national procedures and the international norms together; they must try to make the two work cooperatively for the success of the task at hand.

The basic principle of disaster management, adopted by LAD and mentioned in the INSARAG codes of ethics, is to accept as primary the appointments to be made by the Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA). The local authority is responsible for assessing the need for foreign SR Teams and the specific locations to which they are to be assigned. Yet making the assignment possible is not a task that a local authority can undertake on its own. Although it is the decision-making body, it directly depends on the accurate provision of information and the establishment of contact between the parties. The interpreter is expected to know both parties well enough to find out how to transfer pertinent messages. But this will only happen if the interpreter acts with an awareness of the critical points involved.

The organization of LAD has been defined as part of the disaster-response plan of the Turkish government organizations, within the framework of cooperation with the Directorate of Civil Defence. It thus avoids taking spontaneous action, adopting the principle of receiving instructions from the central authority. However, the moment an interpreter-in-aid starts working with an SR Team as a supporting functional element, he or she will be directed by the head of the team in question (in accordance with INSARAG response principles). This naturally enables the team to act and respond as an organic whole. Interpreters likewise may acquire a role in the overall coordination, other than in terms of the communication services they provide. On the one hand, they have a bilateral representational role as the point of contact between the SR team and the LEMA: they are supposed to be 'loyal' to both parties

(in the sense of Nord 1997 & this volume). On the other hand, interpreters are required to play the role of general communicator, even if they do not really want to, simply because they are familiar with the physical and cultural conditions involved (assuming they are members of the host culture). They might even acquire an informing and warning function in cases of misunderstanding or lack of orientation with respect to the host culture. The ethical framework defining the interpreter's tasks is thus not one-layered; it is a complex whole.

As we can see, the voluntary nature of the LAD organization makes it possible for members to avoid becoming service providers who do no more than carry out instructions. This status provides the basis for an ethical principle that might be ranked above loyalty, namely the principle of 'appropriateness to the purpose', which may determine certain phases and layers of the practice (note that Nord 1997 talks about 'function plus loyalty', allowing for the coexistence of both principles).

For example, a source of conflict commonly reported after the 1999 earthquakes was cultural difference. This could concern things like the way foreign SR team members spent their time off, relaxing after sleepless days and nights by listening to music, sunbathing and drinking. When photographed by newspapers, such scenes created tension with the local public, whose culture demanded quite different behaviour at disaster sites. The interpreters in some cases felt obliged to tell the SR team members about the sensitivities of the local population, in many cases relatives of the victims buried alive under the rubble. Possible conflicts were thus handled by interpreters through sensitizing team members to relevant cultural differences as well as explaining these differences to the local inhabitants.

A second example will help illustrate the importance of the acceptability of the translated message. A voluntary interpreter who assisted the relief teams in the Duzce earthquake in November 1999 reported that in one case while helping distribute aid from the German Red Cross he had to introduce the Red Cross personnel as members of Alman Kizilayi, the German 'Red Crescent' (Red Crescent being the Turkish first aid organization). He said that this 'domestication' saved time and guaranteed cultural acceptability. Such strategies helped the relief teams work more effectively in provinces where religious and cultural prejudices could potentially prove a significant obstacle to efficient communication.

Other anecdotes told by the interpreters suggest that the most critical decision to be taken at the site of an earthquake is to direct the SR teams to a specific building. This could place an enormous ethical burden on the interpreter, considering the foreign SR team's unfamiliarity with the site and their legal responsibility to follow

the LEMA' s action plan and instructions. In making such a critical and ethical decision urgently in a disaster situation, the interpreters also have to deal with the intervention of the locals and vic

tims, who try to manipulate and even mislead the SR teams to the locations where their own relatives and valuables might be buried. The ethical responsibility of the interpreters in such cases is significant, especially due to the shortcomings of governmental authority in this case and an apparent lack of trust by the locals in national disaster-management structure. The ethical frame for SR operations requires a preliminary assessment of the situation through a hail-and-signal search for live victims inside collapsed buildings. The ethics of interpreting in such situations obviously required complete trust in the SR teams. The interpreters reported that they did their best to facilitate the team's work and did not allow the team to be misled by the manipulative comments and desperate cries of the locals.

The interpreters also reported that they felt ethically responsible for preventing delays and loss of time, as well as saving more lives and dealing sympathetically throughout with the victims and locals who sometimes made unreasonable demands. They tried to explain their responsibility to the locals as much as possible. The same ethical code of behaviour required taking initiatives, where the LEMA could not, in arriving at the most effective spontaneous decision (for the next life to be saved). Interpreters were supposed to be aware of all these problems and report them to the incident commander. They were ethically responsible for assessing the situation and creating the most favourable conditions for search and rescue, avoiding futile, negative exchanges that might prevent the saving of more lives. Their role as an intermediary needs to be considered within this flexible ethical frame, which leaves them highly visible at certain points in the process. Indeed, this positionality is set to acquire greater importance as a selection criterion for future volunteers.

It was very important that the protocol signed with the Directorate of Civil Defence allowed for relatively independent action by interpreters. Although the TAD organization is to be mobilized by the government office responsible for disaster management, each interpreter can carry out the task independently in compliance with the protocol and the LAD Code of Conduct. The following article from the protocol defines the process of TAD mobilization and the formal procedure of coordination:

> Article 6-d: LAD Organization assigns LAD volunteers within the framework set and required by the Directorate of Civil Defence; LAD Organization is to decide the tasks to be given to lADs and to coordinate contact with the volunteers throughout the mission. For this purpose a Task Force to operate at disaster situations under TAD Organization will be formed. The assignments and the coordination to be carried out by the LAD Organization Task Force will be planned prior to the disaster and will be activated in accordance with the Action Plan prepared with the consent of the Directorate of Civil Defence.

> The LAD Organization volunteers will work in coordination with the Crisis Centre and the Civil Defence Authorities and will cooperate with the Civil Defence personnel. Those TAD volunteers who do not comply with these conditions will be deprived of the rights of the Civil Defence volunteers.

As can be seen, priority is given to the Crisis Action Plan of the Directorate of Civil Defence, since the primary objective of the interpreting service is to make international cooperation more effective. It is *not* one of the primary objectives of an LAD to bring together parties with different expectations (and explain the different attitudes to each party). The real base for the interpreter' s action here is "the strategy of action-based communication", which has been critiqued by Habermas (1992:144). Indeed, the ethical status of the LAD service can best be explained in terms of 'pragmatic ethics', since the aim of making optimal use of resources is almost axiomatic in international cooperation. Pieper explains the concept as follows: "pragmatic wisdom is instrumental wisdom; it is the wisdom that evaluates the means available and selects the best means, considering its consequences, to reach the target"

(1999:79).

How can we evaluate such a comprehensive and versatile communication role? Note that the interpreting task mentioned here inevitably loses its spontaneity when transferred to well-planned cooperation within the triangular structure of purposeful assignment, preparedness and training. Yet all community interpreters are familiar with roles very similar to the ones mentioned here. The only difference seems to be the indeterminacy

of ‘who does what and where’. Transforming a field of community interpreting into a purposeful assignment might yet be possible through a clearer focus on the task description. There is no *essential* change from other forms of community interpreting in terms of the requirements and the contexts of communication.

If LAD is considered as a cross-cultural communication platform, we might develop better insight into the importance of using interpreters who have sufficient awareness of the possible difficulties and naturally adopt the role of an intermediary agent of communication. The LNSARAG’s ethical principles underscore this fundamental issue. It seems, though, that the ethical principles, which are still developing, are defined as rules at the level of ‘correct behaviour’, which only emphasize the importance of avoiding abusive behaviour. The code of ethics does actually raise many points concerning cross-cultural communication. Sensitive issues include cultural awareness of race, religion and nationality, local customs (food, etc.), language, different local apparel, different work values, value of life, local law-enforcement practices, use of different medications, use of alcohol and illegal drugs, local policy on weapons, handling of sensitive information, use of canines, care and handling of patients and/or the deceased, local living conditions, gender

restrictions, and dress code or standards. However, these points tell us more about what not to do than about actual conduct of work.

Since the LNSARAG guidelines do not focus on developing specific behaviour patterns, many ethical questions remain unanswered. Will cultural differences be taken for granted by SR team members – as well as relief interpreters – without making any judgements? Will the interpreters act as if they had accepted the points of possible conflict as they are, just for the sake of avoiding problems, and continue to serve as diplomatically as possible? How will the common grounds for mutual understanding be established on the land of the host culture? Underlying all of these points is the ethical dilemma caused by the indeterminacies peculiar to the translational action itself The above questions can only find answers if the actual performance of interpreters in disaster areas is investigated in depth.

4. The LAD Training Programme

Although the purpose of this article is not to introduce the LAD Training Programme in detail, it is useful to touch upon a few points. The Interpreter-in-Aid at Disasters is a volunteer giving assistance to foreign SR Teams. This was the basis for the planning of the training programme. The following steps were taken shortly after the launching of the project:

- Assessment of the needs for LAD services;
- Preparation of the training programme based on needs analysis;
- Implementation of the programme with an action plan;
- Planning of the follow-up programme.

The following considerations, designed as key descriptive concepts in the programme, were deduced from our analysis of interviews with interpreters:

- The physical and psychological work conditions; the difficulties awaiting the translator (cf. Baistow 1999, Enweruzor 1999, Leitonen 1999);
- The ethics of an interpreter training programme: considering the needs, describing the actual practice and product, evaluating the problem cases;
- The ethics of the interpreter trainer in terms of direct responsibility for providing materials and scenarios that are true to life;
- The parameters and the general method of the training programme.

LAD candidates filled out an application form and went through an interview. Those accepted attended a 106-hour training programme. The pilot training programme was completed at the end of June 2000 and those who completed it received their identity cards from the Directorate of Civil Defence and their certificates from the Administration of the Faculty of Letters

of Istanbul University. The various sections of the programme were based on the technicality of the subjects covered (information requiring direct contact with subject-matter experts, current use of the information, compilations from the LAD trainees' own scenarios based on authentic accounts of foreign SR team operations). The training programme was the first of its kind, with equal emphasis on civil defence, first aid, background in disasters, establishing contact with relevant organizations, disaster management regulations and interpreting practice.

The insights we have drawn from our particular situation should offer guidelines for further research, as opposed to an ad-hoc approach to community interpreting. Much the same might be said about interpreters working for UN war observers or those at refugee camps (cf. Sunjic 1993). By carrying out research associated with such projects academics may contribute to both the theory and practice of this newly emerging form of interpreting.

5. LAD in disaster response planning: goal statement

A well-structured planning process seems fundamental if interpreters are to work successfully as guidance-providers in disaster conditions. The results expected from the LAD project are thus as follows:

- The interpreter will respond as early as possible in order to function as a supporting and guiding member of the team;
- The LEMA's instructions will be communicated directly to INSARAG and SR teams, which will speed up the flow of information and messages;
- Bureaucratic gaps and rigid or impractical interpretations of regulations will be avoided; the LADs will refer to the LEMA's response attitudes in order to perform in a way appropriate to disaster-management principles;
- LADs knowledgeable about SR operations will have the opportunity to comprehend the contexts and messages accurately and fast enough to act effectively throughout the process;
- LADs who know about the principles and practice of disaster response will feel free to take self-initiated action and establish relations that will facilitate the operations of the team and will establish contact with the locals for the same purpose;
- LADs will act as agents with guiding and warning functions, in accordance with the general principles and codes of international cooperation; they thus remain in line with national requirements and criteria;
- Interpreters who know they are supposed to offer a social and psychological response to disaster and the cultural aspects involved will act as mediating agents who can be successful in avoiding misunderstand-

ings; they will thus be able to differentiate individual responses from cultural ones and set up a more realistic framework for relations between the team, the locals and others;
- Since LADs are familiar with the relevant technical terminology they will communicate better on technical matters;
- It will be possible to find enough interpreters with the necessary qualifications;
- LADs will be aware of their roles as interpreters and will not avoid their responsibilities, which will help them contribute to international cooperation as an effective process of communication and cross-cultural understanding.

6. Conclusion

Achieving the above goals depends on various factors and developments. Work done so far has proved successful in establishing a model and starting the implementation process. We need to train voluntary and professional staff to implement the training and the organizational sub-structure. We also need the LAD model to be adopted by the relevant organizations and individuals. The initial steps have been taken. The expectations of the relevant parties will become clearer in time and an applicable model will be shaped accordingly through the planning process. One important aspect of implementation is to bring the model to the attention of international organizations and thus gear the project toward the international rather than just local scene. Only if the LAD project can be integrated into LNSARAG will it gain credibility in the international sense. More

important, defining the place and the content of these interpreting and translating practices will help establish cross-national and cross-cultural contacts at the optimum level. Hopefully, this article will help introduce the project to translation scholars and translator-training institutions in a variety of countries. We invite those who are interested to cooperate in devising an international model. We might thus take larger steps toward our goals by using the findings of on-going research and establishing internationally shared norms for TAD training.

ALEV BULUT
Istanbul Universitesi. H. A. K E~itirn Fakültesi. Yabanci DillerEgitirni Boll/mu. Ingiliz Diii E~itimiAnabilim Dali. Besim OmerPa%ca Sokak 3447U VezneciierIstanbul, Turkey. obulut@ superonline. corn

TURGAY KURULTAY
Istanbul Universitesi. Edebiyat Fakültesi, Alrnanco Gevin Anabilirn Dali.
Beyazit-Istanbul, Turkey. tkurultay@hotmail.com

Note

1. The term 'hilti' refers to a rescue device. It was coined in Turkish from a brand name.

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Appendix

lAD CODE OF ETHICS

This two-page code was prepared by the lAD Committee of the Turkish Translation Association in May 2000 and has been translated into English for purposes of international contact. Below are the first *5* items of the 14 that reflect the general code and task descriptions:

1. lAD is a voluntary organization. Its objective is to provide interpreting services for foreign rescue teams at times of disaster in accordance with an action plan. The lAD Action Plan has been prepared for the initial purpose of providing interpreting services. Voluntary services apart from this are treated as secondary depending on the priorities of the situation.

2. The range of *lAD* services varies in accordance with the scope of the activities of the foreign rescue teams. Cases of disaster include natural disasters such as earthquake, flood, avalanche and storm, as well as any incident in which a foreign rescue team may require interpreting services.
3. Each TAD shall act in accordance with the steps and principles laid out in the Code of Ethics and the Action Plan. These steps and principles are considered a common frame of behaviour. The Action Plan is in essence the 'Priority Action Plan at Disasters'. In cases where the plan fails alternative plans are implemented.
4. The lADs are independent individuals who develop alternative plans, are capable of taking the initiatives required by the interpreting profession in general, and adjust the priorities to the requirements of the situation as well as acting in accordance with the principles set up for the group.
5. Each TAD has responsibility as a communicator in an international situation, working as part of universal culture, without any religious, linguistic or racial discrimination, remaining sensitive to the norms that change with societies and regions. lADs are representatives of universal cultural values more than those of their native cultures and languages. This is in keeping with their role as mediators in cross-cultural communicative situations.